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BUSHv. GORE AND LAURENCE TRIBE'S 
HALL OF MIRRORS 
Nelson Lund* 
Almost every lawyer with litigation experience, even if only 
in law school moot court exercises, has experienced what might 
be called "acquired conviction syndrome." Having taken on a 
client's cause, and worked hard to develop the best arguments in 
support of that cause, one often finds oneself increasingly per-
suaded that the weight of the arguments supports the client's po-
sition. This can easily happen even if one began by thinking that 
the case was almost certainly a loser. The prevalence of acquired 
conviction syndrome provides a good reason for the custom of 
disclosing one's own involvement in cases on which one later of-
fers academic commentary. This custom certainly doesn't imply 
that such commentary deserves to be dismissed, or even depreci-
ated, but it does alert the reader to the advisability of assessing 
the work with a little extra caution. 
A very lengthy essay by Laurence H. Tribe-eroG v. hsuB 
and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mir-
rors1- reaches the following considered conclusion about the 
Court's holding in that case: "EQUAL PROTECTION, MY 
ASS! "2 Notwithstanding Professor Tribe's vulgar expression of 
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thanks to Stephen G. Gilles, Mara S. Lund, John 0. McGinnis, and Michael Stokes 
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!. 115 Harv. L. Rev.170 (2001). 
2. In December of 2000, soon after the Supreme Court announced its deci-
sion, some Democratic voters in Florida began replacing their red-white-and-
blue Gore-Lieberman buttons with black buttons with white lettering stating 
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contempt for the Court, his essay is extremely sophisticated. It 
deserves to be read carefully, though with due regard for the fact 
that he was deeply involved, as one of Gore's lawyers, in the liti-
gation that culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in Bush 
v. Gore. Professor Tribe recognizes this, of course, and rightly 
says of his effort to offer a "more balanced" account than others 
have provided that "the proof of that pudding will have to be in 
the eating."3 My own comments-which will be a great deal 
more concise,4 and less autobiographical5 -should also be read 
with caution. Although I was not directly involved in the litiga-
tion, I published several short pieces about the Florida election 
dispute while it was going on, and immediately after it was re-
solved.6 And I wanted Bush to become President, perhaps al-
most as much as Professor Tribe wanted Gore to win. 
Much of Professor Tribe's essay is taken up with responses 
to other commentators, analysis of Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
concurrence, and other matters that are peripheral to the central 
question of the legal merits of the Court's decision and opinion. 
Much of this extra material is quite unexceptionable, but its 
daunting volume and dazzling intricacy may easily distract the 
simply: "Equal Protection, My Ass!" This outburst has intuitive appeal, captur-
ing the "where the hell did that come from?" reaction of many voters, lawyers, 
and academics who read the opinion .... 
. . . . We have returned to where we started: with a group of disil-
lusioned Florida voters unconvinced by the Court's equal protection 
rationale in any of its guises. And we're left with a badge that rightly 
proclaims: "EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!" 
Id. at 221-22, 247 (emphasis added, all caps in original). The passage referred to by ellip-
sis in this quotation, which is part of a subsection entitled "Speaking Theoretically-The 
Constitutional Shell Game," contains a lengthy discussion of three types of constitutional 
analysis that might be thought to justify the outcome in the case. Lest one wonder 
whether Professor Tribe endorsed the slogan on the badge when he wrote that the badge 
"rightly proclaims" that slogan, consider another of Professor Tribe's summaries of his 
conclusion: 
Mesmerized by the Court's prestidigitation, voters might miss the fact that 
the pea has already been palmed: there is no hidden constitutional reason to 
uncover. None of these shells contains a defensible rationale, but each is suffi-
ciently distracting to leave at least some observers thinking that there must be 
something valid hidden there. 
Id. at 222 (emphasis in original). 
3. Id. at 178-79. 
4. Professor Tribe's article is 133 pages long, and it includes 533 footnotes. 
5. See, e.g., Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 172 n.t, 182-83,277 n.433, 301-302 (cited in 
note 1). 
6. An Act of Courage, The Weekly Standard 19 (Dec. 25, 2000); Travesty in Talla-
hassee, The Weekly Standard 17 (Dec. 18, 2000); Supreme Court's Not the Last Word, 
New York Post 31 (Dec. 4, 2000); Courts Don't Own the Law, New York Post 29 (Nov. 
20, 2000). I subsequently published a detailed defense of the Court's decision in the case: 
The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1219 (2002). 
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reader's eye from the absence of any solid arguments that can 
support Professor Tribe's two principal conclusions about the 
decision in Bush v. Gore. Those two conclusions can be stated 
very simply: the Court's equal protection ruling was untenable as 
a matter of law, and the case in any event was technically nonjus-
ticiable.7 And on the basis of these conclusions, Professor Tribe 
renders this further verdict: the five "Justices in the Bush v. Gore 
majority have little but disdain for Congress as a serious partner 
in the constitutional enterprise, and not much patience with 'We 
the People' as the ultimate source of sovereignty in this repub-
lic. "8 
Those conclusions are genuinely indefensible, and Professor 
Tribe is forced to rely entirely on sleights of hand in order to 
make them look like the results of a detached and sober analysis. 
The following commentary will show why Professor Tribe's brief 
against the Court will not withstand disinterested scrutiny. 
I. EQUAL PROTECTION AND PRECEDENT 
As everyone knows, the Supreme Court's decision in Bush 
v. Gore came at the end of a complex and multifaceted process 
of legal and political maneuvering, much of which involved the 
intricacies of Florida election law. In order to understand the 
Court's ruling, however, one can get by with only the briefest 
summary of the background.9 
After the initial count of the ballots, which had Bush ahead 
by a small margin, and an automatic recount authorized by state 
law, which also gave Bush a small lead, Gore asked for addi-
tional recounts by local election officials in four heavily Democ-
ratic counties. Overruling Florida's Secretary of State, the Flor-
7. One other point deserves a brief mention. Professor Tribe appears to contend 
(as many other commentators have contended), that the Supreme Court forbade the 
Florida court from ordering a new recount on remand. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 263 
(cited in note 1) ("The Court's only justification for ending the recount, rather than at 
least allowing the Florida Supreme Court to try to fashion a remedy for the supposed 
defects in its December 8 order .... "); see also id. at 268 (referring to the Court's "dcci· 
sian to toss out all the remaining legal votes as of 10 p.m. on December 12, 2000"). For 
reasons that I have explained elsewhere, this is a demonstrably incorrect interpretation 
of the Court's opinion. Lund, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1270-78 (cited in note 6). To their 
credit, some of Gore's other lawyers have refrained from endorsing this misreading of 
Bush v. Gore. See id. at 1277 n.185 (discussing public statements of David Boies and 
Ronald Klain). 
8. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 290 (cited in note 1). 
9. For a more detailed discussion of the factual and legal background, see Lund, 
23 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1224-43 (cited in note 6). 
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ida Supreme Court granted an extension of time for these re-
counts to be conducted, but two of the counties failed to meet 
the new, court-ordered deadline. The Secretary of State then de-
clared Bush the winner of Florida's electoral votes, and Gore 
filed a lawsuit making a number of demands, all of which were 
rejected by the trial court. Three of those demands, however, 
were ultimately granted by a 4-3 vote of the Florida Supreme 
Court, which ordered the trial court to take the following steps: 
• Add a net of 215 votes (or perhaps 176, depending on a fac-
tual issue that the appellate judges did not resolve) to 
Gore's total, based on the Palm Beach County recount, 
whose results were not reported to the Secretary of State 
before the court-ordered deadline. 
• Add a net of 168 votes for Gore to the vote totals, based on 
an uncompleted recount conducted in Miami-Dade County 
that had begun with the more heavily Democratic precincts 
in that jurisdiction. 
• Conduct a manual recount of 9,000 Miami-Dade "under-
vote" ballots, which Gore claimed might shift the statewide 
totals in his favor. 10 
The Florida Supreme Court also ordered the trial court to take 
one more step, which Gore had not requested: 
• Conduct a statewide recount of some kind, which the Flor-
ida Supreme Court strongly suggested should be limited to a 
recount of the "undervote" ballots in each county. 11 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Florida court, holding 
that this four-part order (whatever its merits may have been as 
an interpretation of state law) violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. Without concluding that any one element was constitu-
tionally fatal, the Court held that the combination of the follow-
ing facts prevented the order from satisfying "the minimum re-
quirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to 
secure the fundamental right" to vote. 12 
10. "Undervotes" are ballots on which a counter did not detect any choice for the 
office of President. Similarly, "overvotes" are ballots on which a counter detected more 
than one choice for President and thus registered no vote. 
II. Technically, the Florida Supreme Court only required the trial court to consider 
conducting a statewide recount, perhaps because of doubts about the supreme court's 
jurisdiction to order the recount. The trial court did begin doing exactly what the su-
preme court had suggested that it do, and it has become customary to treat the supreme 
court's suggestion as if it had been an order. Little, if anything, turns on the distinction 
now. 
12. 531 U.S. at 105. 
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• Varying standards for determining a voter's intent had been 
employed by the counties in which manual recounts had 
been held, and at least one county changed its standard re-
peatedly during the recount. 
• Unlike the recounts in the Gore-selected counties, which 
had included all ballots, the statewide recount was limited 
to "undervotes," and did not even include the analytically 
indistinguishable "overvote" ballots. 
• Partial results from the uncompleted recount in Miami-
Dade had been used to credit one candidate with additional 
votes, and the Florida court evidently contemplated the fu-
ture use of partial recounts. 
• The statewide recount was being conducted by untrained 
personnel, unguided by objective standards for identifying 
legal votes, and observers were not permitted to make con-
temporaneous objections. 
The Court relied for its decision primarily upon Reynolds v. 
Sims13 and related decisions, including Gray v. Sanders 14 and 
Moore v. Ogilvie. 15 The essence of the Court's argument was that 
these vote-dilution cases prohibit a state from arbitrarily treating 
ballots differently depending on where they are cast. Acknowl-
edging that it is impossible to treat every ballot or every voter 
absolutely identically in all respects, the Court concluded that 
the recount ordered by the Florida court was permeated with 
avoidable and unjustified nonuniformity, in violation of the prin-
ciples established by Reynolds. 16 
In an uncharacteristically terse discussion, Professor Tribe 
dismisses these precedents by distinguishing them on their 
facts. 17 And he concludes his discussion of equal protection the-
ory and doctrine by endorsing the conclusion set forth on badges 
13. 377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
14. 372 u.s. 368 (1963). 
15. 394 U.S. 814 (1969). 
16. Professor Tribe mistakenly believes that the Court also held that the Florida 
court's order violated due process. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 177, 219, 233-34 (cited in 
note 1). In fact, the Supreme Court's holding was based exclusively on equal protection. 
See 531 U.S. at 103 ("[W]e find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."). The 
Court's only comment on due process came when it remarked that "it is obvious that the 
recount [initiated by the Florida court] cannot be conducted in compliance with the re-
quirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work."Id. 
at 110. Due process would, for example, require "orderly judicial review of any disputed 
matters that might arise." Id. This does not imply, or even suggest, that the Florida court 
had already violated due process. 
I 7. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 222-26 (cited in note 1). 
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that some outraged Gore supporters began wearing after the de-
cision: "EQUAL PROTECfiON, MY ASS!" 18 This formulation 
is somewhat jarring in a piece that purports to offer a "balanced" 
and "measured" assessment of the Court's work, 19 which he 
elsewhere indicates has left him with "a sad lump in the throat 
that will, stubbornly, never go away."20 
More important, expressions either of contempt or of 
deeply felt grief are pretty hard to reconcile with Professor 
Tribe's later acknowledgment that Justices Souter and Breyer, 
who also concluded that the Equal Protection Clause had been 
violated, would not have been likely to accept a transparently 
untenable legal theory.Z1 Professor Tribe might also have noted, 
though he does not, that three Democrats dissented from the 
Florida Supreme Court's decision, in part for the same reasons 
adopted by seven members of the U.S. Supreme Court.22 As we 
shall see, it is no coincidence that such a wide spectrum of judges 
all agreed that the Equal Protection Clause had been violated. 
The cute vulgarity on the Gore supporters' buttons will not 
withstand scrutiny. Neither will the reference to a Hall of Mir-
rors in the title of Professor Tribe's essay. The real Hall of Mir-
rors is the one he himself has constructed. 
A. THE LAW THAT APPLIED IN BUSHV. GORE 
Perhaps it is best to begin by asking what the Gore support-
ers who came up with the slogan "EQUAL PROTECfiON, MY 
ASS!" might have meant. For people who are generally familiar 
with the Court's work, but not immersed in the intricacies of 
equal protection case law, the Court's decision might well have 
seemed quite startling, and transparently dishonest. In many 
cases over the past quarter century or so, the Court has insisted 
that a plaintiff must show more than unequal effects: discrimina-
tory purpose is ordinarily a necessary element of an equal pro-
tection claim.Z3 The Court, including the five members of the 
Bush v. Gore majority, has been insistent about policing this 
limit on the reach of equal protection analysis, which has been 
18. See note 2. 
19. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 178-79 (cited in note 1). 
20. Id. at 302. 
21. See id. at 292-93. 
22. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1267 (Wells, C.J., dissenting), 1272 (Harding, J., 
dissenting) (Fla. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
23. E.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); Washington v. Davis, 426 
u.s. 229 (1976). 
2002] "EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"? 549 
applied, for example, in cases involving claims of racial vote-
dilution.24 Nor have the most conservative Justices shown much 
willingness to expand the reach of equal protection doctrine into 
new areas?5 One possible exception-a telling exception for 
many observers-has been in the field of affirmative action, 
where the more conservative Justices have pushed to protect the 
victims of so-called reverse discrimination.2 
In Bush v. Gore, the Court demanded no showing of dis-
criminatory purpose or intent. Nor did the Court identify any 
"suspect class" or "discrete and insular minority" whose interests 
were threatened by a politically powerful majority. So it may 
have looked rather obviously as though a sudden and unex-
plained equal protection innovation had magically emerged from 
just those Justices usually most averse to such judicial activism. 
And just in time to rescue a Republican presidential candidate 
who had promised to appoint more Justices who would be reluc-
tant to overturn the legal precedents that these same Justices 
had devoted their careers to establishing. 
Plausible as this story might sound, and I don't doubt that 
many sincere supporters of Vice President Gore must have be-
lieved it, it is based on a very simple mistake. The cases that call 
this story forth all belong to the branch of equal protection case 
law that deals with so-called suspect classifications, such as race. 
But these "suspect classification" cases-including those dealing 
with racial vote dilution- have almost nothing to do with Bush 
v. Gore, which is part of a completely different line of cases usu-
ally referred to as the "fundamental rights" strand of equal pro-
tection law. 
The anomalies that leap out when Bush v. Gore is compared 
with "suspect classification" cases disappear once one recognizes 
that this was a "fundamental rights" case. First, this latter line of 
cases deals mainly with voting rights, which is exactly what was 
involved in Bush v. Gore. So there was no striking innovation of 
24. E.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
25. Sec, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (state constitutional provision 
prohibiting certain kinds of special legal protections for homosexuals held unconstitu-
tional). Justice Scalia's dissent in this case was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Thomas. 
26. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiza, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), where the same 
five Justices who formed the majority in Bush v. Gore overruled a recent affirmative-
action precedent, and remanded the case with instructions to apply strict scrutiny to a 
federal program involving set-asides for minority contractors. Cf. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. 
Rev. at 251 (cited in note 1) (mistakenly asserting that the Court "struck down a gov-
ernment set-aside" in this case). 
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the kind that the Court's more conservative members have re-
sisted when other members of the Court have wanted to expand 
the list of "suspect classifications." Second, the Court has never 
required a showing of discriminatory purpose in fundamental-
rights cases. It certainly would have been a major innovation if 
this requirement had been dropped or ignored in a suspect-
classification case, but there is not and never has been any such 
requirement in fundamental-rights cases. 
The Gore supporters who came up with the protest button 
may not have known about the difference between suspect-
classification cases and fundamental-rights cases. Professor 
Tribe, however, has probably forgotten more about these cases 
than most people will ever know. Unfortunately, as we shall see, 
his analysis in this article fails to take account of some significant 
points about these cases. 
Before we get to that, let's consider Professor Tribe's prin-
cipal attack on the Court's legal analysis. Recognizing that the 
Court relied primarily on Reynolds v. Sims and related cases, 
Professor Tribe attempts to distinguish those cases from Bush v. 
Gore. As every lawyer knows, any case can be distinguished 
from any other case "on the facts," sometimes legitimately and 
sometimes not. The distinctions on which Professor Tribe relies 
are not legitimate, and they are such that even he does not con-
sistently adhere to them. 
The facts in Reynolds v. Sims are well known. A number of 
state legislatures had failed to reapportion the districts for state 
legislative seats after population shifts had made some of those 
districts much more populous than others. Professor Tribe dis-
misses the relevance of this case because "Florida's at-large 
scheme in no way implicated the Reynolds skewed district con-
cern."27 
Two other cases cited by the Court in Bush v. Gore receive 
similarly dismissive treatment. Gray v. Sanders held that state-
wide elections may not be conducted under a system resembling 
the federal electoral college, and Moore v. Ogilvie that a state 
may not require that a nominating petition for presidential elec-
tor include the signatures of at least 200 qualified voters from 
each of at least 50 counties. Professor Tribe dismisses these 
precedents because they are "immediately distinguishable on the 
ground that each case involved a plan implemented by the state 
27. Tribe, llS Harv. L. Rev. at 223 (cited in note 1). 
2002] "EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"? 551 
legislature that clearly had the purpose and effect of granting 
greater voting power to a particular class-in both cases, rural 
voters. "28 
Are these distinctions legitimate or illegitimate? It is true 
that the technical holding in Reynolds was only that state legisla-
tive seats must be apportioned on an equipopulation basis. And 
the holdings in Gray and Moore are similarly limited to the spe-
cific schemes at issue in those cases. But Chief Justice Warren's 
opinion in Reynolds also articulated the broader principle on 
which that decision was based: "[T]he right of suffrage can be 
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's 
vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise 
of the franchise .... Weighting the votes of citizens differently, 
by any method or means, merely because of where they happen 
to reside, hardly seems justifiable. One must be ever aware that 
the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated as well as simpleminded 
modes of discrimination. "'29 
Contrary to Professor Tribe's suggestion, the Court has not 
limited the Reynolds principles to cases involving "skewed dis-
tricts."30 Nor has the Court limited the reach of those principles 
to schemes "that clearly had the purpose and effect of granting 
greater voting power to a particular class."31 Consider, for exam-
ple, O'Brien v. Skinner.32 In this case, state law permitted absen-
tee voting only by those who were absent from their county of 
residence on election day. When applied to persons in jail, it had 
the odd and presumably unforeseen effect of discriminating be-
tween those who were jailed in their county of residence and 
those who were jailed elsewhere. Although this was a vote-
denial case, to which Reynolds' vote-dilution holding was not di-
rectly applicable, the Court held that the statute violated equal 
protection without even suggesting that the absence of a legisla-
tive purpose to increase the voting power of a particular class 
was relevant. Similarly, Reynolds and other opinions have con-
demned a variety of vote-dilution practices that have nothing to 
do with "skewed districts," such as altering ballots and stuffing 
the ballot box. 33 
28. Id. at 225. 
29. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555,563 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
30. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 223 (cited in note 1). 
31. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). 
32. 414 U.S. 524 (1974). 
33. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555; Anderson v. United Stales, 417 U.S. 211, 227 
(1974); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 
(1962). 
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The principle actually underlying Reynolds and related 
cases is not a concern with "skewed districts," but rather with 
"any method or means" of weighting votes differently depending 
on where voters reside. The recount scheme devised by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court was unique in history, so of course there 
could be no legal precedent exactly on point. But Florida voters 
were certainly treated differently depending on where they lived. 
Most obviously, voters who had their "overvote" ballots manu-
ally reexamined in the four counties that Gore selected for hand 
recounts were more likely to have their votes count than those 
who cast similar ballots elsewhere. Similarly, voters who cast 
"dimpled chad" ballots in Broward County were treated differ-
ently than those who cast similar ballots in Palm Beach. Voters 
living in the unrecounted (and more Republican) precincts of 
Miami-Dade did not have their ballots manually reexamined, 
while those living in the recounted (and more Democratic) pre-
cincts did. The differential treatment of voters by the Florida 
court may seem arbitrary in a way that a settled plan to disad-
vantage rural voters does not, but the Court has never held that 
such a settled plan is a necessary element of an equal protection 
violation, and O'Brien illustrates that even inadvertently arbi-
trary voting schemes can violate the Constitution. 
The differences in the way Florida voters were treated, 
moreover, were not randomly arbitrary. The Florida court 
largely accepted one litigant's self-serving requests in a particu-
lar election, and it did so at a time when any recount could help 
only that particular candidate (because his opponent had already 
been certified as the winner of the election by Florida's Secre-
tary of State). Even if one assumes that the Florida court's ex-
traordinary order was authorized by state law, the absence of a 
settled legislative plan to disadvantage a durable interest group 
like urban voters can hardly serve to take the case outside Rey-
nolds' admonition against "sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination." If it could, Reynolds' express 
condemnation of stuffed ballot boxes (a practice that has proba-
bly never been part of a settled legislative plan) would be non-
sensical. 
It is true, of course, that Reynolds never said that the treat-
ment of voters must be perfectly equae4 That would be impossi-
34. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 ("We realize that it is a practical impossibil-
ity to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, or 
citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitu-
tional requirement.") (footnote omitted)). 
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ble, and the Court has, for example, permitted a variety of devia-
tions from the equipopulation requirement for legislative dis-
tricts.35 But it is also true that Reynolds must be read to cover 
some situations on which the Court has not already precisely 
ruled, including cases that fall outside the "skewed district" ru-
bric. And Professor Tribe himself later admits that this is true: 
"No one doubts that the Reynolds line would prevent a state 
from adopting a system in which those who tally machine-
rejected ballots manually are instructed to toss out ballots with 
ambiguous marks indicating an intent to vote for Bush but to 
count all the votes for Gore. "36 
The Supreme Court concluded that the facts in Bush v. 
Gore are more like this hypothetical than like the innumerable 
situations in which minor or unavoidable deviations from perfect 
equality are permissible. The nature of the Supreme Court's 
equal protection jurisprudence has produced a huge range of 
cases in which a decision either way would be neither indisputa-
bly correct nor impossible to defend. Bush v. Gore falls within 
that range, though the Court's holding is extremely easy to de-
fend. Even granting that it may not be absolutely unchallenge-
able, Professor Tribe's attempt to dismiss the Court's conclusion 
as untenable is itself untenable. 
Implicitly abandoning his "skewed district" explanation for 
Reynolds, Professor Tribe reframes the Court's prohibition 
against "sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of dis-
crimination" as an affirmative requirement that "the method of 
counting [be] fair." 37 Professor Tribe then asserts that the proce-
dures adopted by the Florida Supreme Court "certainly passed 
35. Similarly, the Court has not used Reynolds to condemn all forms of gerryman-
dering, which certainly do entail "sophisticated modes of discrimination." See Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Professor Tribe invokes this case for the proposition that 
the Court has permitted "just the sort of partisan politicking the Bush Court seemingly 
wanted to exclude." Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 223 (cited in note 1). Unfortunately for 
that argument, there was no majority opinion in Davis, and the result in the case might 
well be explained by an implicit recognition of the impossibility of identifying "ungerry-
mandered" apportionment schemes that would pass constitutional muster if gerryman-
dering were outlawed. Cf. 478 U.S. at 144-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(arguing that if the principle underlying the plurality's "nebulous standard" for evaluat-
ing partisan gerrymanders were taken seriously, it would lead to the abolition of district-
based representation in favor of a proportional representation system). 
36. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 224 (cited in note 1). See also id. at 222 n.195 ("Even 
under traditional doctrines, counting the ballots of Palm Beach County twice and those 
of Broward County just once, for instance-giving Palm Beach voters twice as much in-
fluence on the outcome as Broward voters-would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause."). 
37. ld. at 224. 
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this test."38 The principal basis for this startling conclusion is that 
" [ n ]othing in the record indicated that the Florida Legislature, 
the state judiciary, or the county recount teams intended to dis-
criminate against any class, suspect or otherwise ... "39 
First, Professor Tribe is once again wrong to assume that in-
tentional discrimination is a necessary element of an equal pro-
tection claim under the voting rights branch of equal protection 
doctrine. O'Brien vividly illustrates the absence of such a re-
quirement, and Professor Tribe cites no case in which the Court 
has rejected such a claim for failure to prove discriminatory in-
tent. It is quite true that nobody proved that the four judges in 
the Florida Supreme Court majority had acted with the discrimi-
natory intent that is required in cases arising under the suspect-
class branch of equal protection doctrine. It is also quite irrele-
vant. 
Furthermore, assuming that we should accept Professor 
Tribe's characterization of Reynolds' rationale as a "fairness" ra-
tionale, can one really maintain with a straight face that all of the 
elements of the Florida court's order were fair? Consider some 
examples of how Professor Tribe attempts to do so. 
Miami-Dade had begun its recount with more heavily De-
mocratic precincts and never got around to recounting more Re-
publican precincts.40 Notwithstanding this obvious partisan bias, 
the Florida court ordered that Gore be credited with all the 
votes that he picked up in this partial recount, and did not re-
quire that the recount be completed. Professor Tribe defends 
this bizarre ruling because of the incentive effects it supposedly 
creates: 
[A] rule that permits inclusion of all legal votes identified 
through the preliminary manual recount, and only those 
votes, encourages each candidate to mobilize the county can-
vassing boards to count all votes in the precincts that the can-
didate deems most favorable. Including partial results thereby 
increases the likelihood that complete results will be obtained, 
a fact that a backward looking analysis, taking the U.S. Su-
preme Court's later intervention for granted, neglects.41 
38. Id 
39. Id. at 225-26. 
40. See Trial Transcript, Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Leon Cty. Jud. Cir. Dec. 2, 
2000) at 461-83 (unrebutted testimony of Thomas Spencer) (transcript available at 
<http://election2000.stanford.edu> ). 
41. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 215-16 (cited in note 1) (emphasis in original). 
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A "backward looking" analysis, however, is exactly what the 
Florida court adopted, for no one had ever imagined such a rule 
until Gore asked the Florida courts to invent the rule and apply 
it retroactively.42 So here is Professor Tribe's concept of "fair-
ness": In response to a Democratic candidate's demand for are-
count in a heavily Democratic county, a canvassing board domi-
nated by Democrats elected in partisan elections begins 
recounting the more heavily Democratic precincts, and does not 
recount the ballots in more Republican precincts. And it is "fair" 
for a court to give the Democratic candidate the benefit of this 
partial recount, thereby possibly changing the result of an elec-
tion for President of the United States, in order to encourage fu-
ture candidates in future elections in Florida to "mobilize" local 
officials of their opponents' party to comply expeditiously with 
demands made by the candidates' opponents. No disinterested 
commentator could possibly call this "fair." 
Even the Florida court's majority recognized the gross un-
fairness of conducting a recount of just those jurisdictions chosen 
by one of the candidates and his partisan allies, which is why 
these judges directed, sua sponte, that some kind of statewide re-
count be initiated. And when the United States Supreme Court 
also acknowledges the patently discriminatory nature of the Mi-
ami-Dade partial recount, can one really respond by saying 
"EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"? This is not the balanced 
and measured analysis that Professor Tribe promised at the out-
set of his essay, and I do not believe that it reflects a notion of 
"fairness" that deserves the name. 
Consider next the Florida court's decision to overlay a se-
lective statewide reexamination of "undervote" ballots after ac-
cepting a recount of all ballots in certain counties (and parts of 
certain other counties) selected by Gore and his fellow Democ-
rats. The Supreme Court concisely explained why there is a 
"fairness" problem with this procedure: 
A manual recount of all ballots identifies not only those bal-
lots which show no vote but also those which contain more 
than one, the so-called overvotes. Neither category will be 
counted by the machine. This is not a trivial concern. At oral 
42. The novelty of the Florida court's recount order is indisputable, for nothing like 
this had ever been done in Florida. That point is quite separate from the question 
whether the novel recount order was based on a defensible interpretation of the Florida 
statutes. I do not believe that it was, see Lund, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1235-43 (cited in 
note 6), but the equal protection problems with the recount order would be the same 
whether or not the order was based on a correct interpretation of the Florida statutes. 
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argument, respondents estimated there are as many as 
110,000 overvotes statewide. As a result, the citizen whose 
ballot was not read by a machine because he failed to vote for 
a candidate in a way readable by a machine may still have his 
vote counted in a manual recount; on the other hand, the citi-
zen who marks two candidates in a way discernible by the ma-
chine will not have the same opportunity to have his vote 
count, even if a manual examination of the ballot would re-
veal the requisite indicia of intent. Furthermore, the citizen 
who marks two candidates, only one of which is discernible by 
the machine, will have his vote counted even though it should 
have been read as an invalid ballot.43 
So far as I can see, Professor Tribe offers no "fairness" rationale 
at all for limiting the statewide recount to undervote ballots, and 
no response at all to the Supreme Court's analysis.44 
If a rule limiting recounts to "undervote" ballots had been 
adopted in advance of the election, when nobody could know 
which candidate would be helped by it, one might try to defend 
it as a harmlessly arbitrary rule. But that is not at all what hap-
pened here. Whether or not the Florida statutes could be inter-
preted to authorize the Florida courts to invent rules like this 
one, it was a completely novel procedure invented for the occa-
sion by the Florida court. Even if we assume that Bush and Gore 
were equally likely to pick up votes in a recount of undervote 
ballots, Bush had already come out ahead in the machine counts, 
so the rule could only benefit Gore. And, for the reasons given 
by the Supreme Court, one could not maintain with a straight 
face that the arbitrarily limited recount ordered by the Florida 
court would provide a more accurate determination of which 
candidate received more votes in Florida. 
B. WAS THE LAW APPLIED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
SENSELESS? 
This comparison between the accuracy of the machine count 
and of the recount ordered by the Florida court brings us to Pro-
fessor Tribe's deepest, and most deeply misleading, criticisms of 
43. 531 U.S. at 107-08. 
44. Professor Tribe misleadingly points out that preexisting Florida law did not 
permit the counting of overvotes. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 237 & n.267 (cited in note 
1). Florida law did treat ballots containing votes for more than one candidate as invalid. 
But the law also treated ballots containing votes for no candidate (undervotes) as invalid. 
And neither fact has anything to do with the issue in the case, which was whether certain 
ballots would be reexamined to see whether the counting machines had or had not classi-
fied them according to the applicable legal standard. 
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Bush v. Gore's equal protection analysis. The essence of that 
criticism begins with the proposition that every mode of counting 
ballots contains biases and inaccuracies of various kinds, which 
implies that there are many defensible ways of conducting an 
election, none of which can be said to be inherently superior to 
the others. Professor Tribe argues that the machine recounts and 
the recount ordered by the Florida court were both within an ac-
ceptable range of imperfection, and that the Supreme Court 
therefore could have no principled basis for choosing one over 
the other: 
[N)o uniform set of statewide counting standards could begin 
to account for all the differences in the design and thickness 
of ballots; in the form and maintenance of tabulation equip-
ment; and in the age, political leanings, and other demo-
graphic characteristics of distinct areas yielding errors of ei-
ther false exclusion or false inclusion (including its most 
extreme variant, false reversal). No uniform set of standards 
can in the end minimize the aggregate number of errors or 
come any closer to approximating what the Court deemed the 
applicable ideal of "one person, one vote."45 
Analytically, there actually is something to this argument. In an 
election that was this close, I agree, it really is impossible to say 
that the vote totals certified by Florida's Secretary of State were 
certain to be more accurate (or were demonstrably more likely 
to correctly identify the winner of more votes) than whatever to-
tals would have emerged from the recount ordered by the Flor-
ida court.46 But that does not undermine the equal protection 
analysis in Bush v. Gore, for several reasons. 
First, to the extent that one takes this analysis seriously, it 
implies that the Reynolds line of cases was wrongly decided. 
That line of cases, it should be recalled, does not categorically 
forbid vote dilution or require absolute adherence to the "one 
person, one vote" ideal. Rather it subjects vote-dilution practices 
to strict scrutiny. Just to take one obvious example of the differ-
ence this makes, the Court has not required districts to be appor-
45. Id. at 257. 
46. Some media reports have carelessly suggested that Bush would have emerged 
the winner if the recount ordered by the Florida court had been completed. In fact, how-
ever, the recount initiated by the Florida court was not proceeding according to fixed 
standards, and thus there is no way to know how the innumerable questions that would 
have arisen before it was finished were going to be resolved. For a useful elaboration on 
this point, see Einer Elhauge, Florida 2000: Bush Wins Again!, The Weekly Standard 29-
31 (Nov. 26, 2001). 
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tioned based on a census taken on the very day an election is 
held. Similarly, to take a slightly less obvious example, the Court 
has allowed apportionment to be based on total population 
rather than the population of eligible voters. But the existence of 
these and many other deviations from the Court's "one person, 
one vote" ideal (some of which are identifiable and some of 
which are presumably undiscovered) has not been taken to im-
ply that the various forms of vote dilution that the Court has in-
validated are indistinguishable from those that the Court has 
permitted. 
One can argue about whether the Court has drawn the lines 
in appropriate places, but one cannot rely on Professor Tribe's 
analytical argument without demolishing the foundations on 
which the Reynolds line of cases rests: his analysis inexorably 
leads to the conclusion that voting practices that result in vote 
dilution should be subject only to rational-basis scrutiny. Under 
rational-basis scrutiny, Reynolds itself would have been wrongly 
decided, for there are a number of legitimate government pur-
poses that can be served by malapportioned districts, as the 
Court acknowledged.47 But Professor Tribe does not repudiate 
Reynolds. On the contrary, he expressly embraces what he calls 
the "nurturing earth" of that decision.48 
And even if one could reinterpret Reynolds and related 
cases as adopting a rational-basis standard of review,49 one could 
still not use that reinterpretation to impugn the decision in Bush 
v. Gore because the Florida court's order in that case was far 
more irrational than some of the malapportionment schemes 
that the Court has declared unconstitutional. At least some as-
pects of the Florida court order at issue in Bush v. Gore were so 
arbitrary that even Justices Souter and Breyer acknowledged 
that the Equal Protection Clause had been violated. Neither of 
the other dissenters (Justices Stevens and Ginsburg) even at-
47. E.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579-81. 
48. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 274 (cited in note 1). 
49. Some of the Court's opinions, including Reynolds itself, contain isolated phrases 
that suggest the use of rational-basis scrutiny. Those same cases, however, also contain 
language that points toward the use of strict scrutiny, and, more important, the analysis 
actually used is clearly the kind of analysis that is now conventionally called strict scru-
tiny. In McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), a case 
relied on by Justice Ginsburg in her Bush v. Gore dissent, the Court really did sound as 
though it was employing rational-basis review. But in a subsequent case, which Justice 
Ginsburg tellingly did not cite, the Court dispelled that apparent implication by charac-
terizing McDonald as a case in which no review at all was required because it was a vote-
denial case in which the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they were actually prohibited 
from voting. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512,520-21 (1973). 
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tempted to explain how the Florida court's order could be rec-
onciled with the principles articulated in Reynolds, and Professor 
Tribe never succeeds in doing so either. 
Furthermore, let us assume for the sake of argument that 
the counting processes that led to Bush's certification as the 
winner of the election may have contained so much unjustifiable 
nonuniformity that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. Even 
if that were true, the fact remains that nobody proved any such 
thing in court. Indeed, Gore never alleged any such thing.50 It 
simply cannot be that the Supreme Court is required to conduct 
an independent investigation of all of the unchallenged election 
practices that a state employs before it can declare that a chal-
lenged election practice is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court 
certainly did not do any such thing in Reynolds, nor could it have 
done so. Neither could it have done so in Bush v. Gore. 
It is perfectly true that the impossibility of eliminating all 
inequalities in a state's election processes means that the courts 
should not jump to invalidate practices for which there are no 
apparent good alternatives. Such an approach would be asinine, 
and would invite a variety of opportunistic litigation strategies 
by disappointed candidates and their supporters. But that is not 
what happened in Bush v. Gore. There are obviously many ways 
of counting ballots that do not entail anything like the arbitrary 
and biased recount procedure ordered by the Florida court. A 
hand recount of all the ballots in Florida is one obvious example. 
The initial machine counts of the ballots is another. It simply is 
not the case that the underlying count that Gore was challenging 
obviously entailed anything comparable to the arbitrary and bi-
ased features that the Supreme Court found in the recount pro-
cedure that it struck down. 
Finally, one should note that one of the many questionable 
practices that the Reynolds Court did not examine was partisan 
gerrymandering, notwithstanding the fact that much of the effect 
of malapportioned districts can be reproduced through this de-
50. Professor Tribe quietly and indirectly acknowledges as much when he states 
that Gore's lawyers "raised the issue of the unreliability of the underlying count" in a 
footnote in a different case arising from the Florida election dispute. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. 
Rev. at 260 n.371 (cited in note 1). This footnote did not really raise or argue any legal 
issue at all, for it merely described how "undervote" ballots can be produced in punch-
card voting systems, and noted that any votes "reflected" on such ballots would not be 
counted unless a manual recount were conducted. In neither this case nor in Bush v. 
Gore did Gore claim that the underlying count violated the Equal Protection Clause or 
any other provision of the Constitution. 
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vice.51 Professor Tribe is quick to point out that in Davis v. Ban-
demer the Court was much more tolerant of such gerrymander-
ing than of malapportionment.52 And it is certainly true that the 
Davis Court did not explain how the result in that case fit with 
the principles of Reynolds. Although one wouldn't know it from 
reading Professor Tribe's article, however, the Davis Court 
didn't really explain much of anything because there was no ma-
jority opinion, and the concurring opinions that produced a ma-
jority for the judgment were analytically incommensurable with 
each other. More fundamentally, however, Davis revealed that a 
serious effort to follow Reynolds' logic in the context of partisan 
gerrymandering would culminate in the replacement of district-
based representation with proportional representation. The 
Reynolds Court clearly did not contemplate so monumental a re-
structuring of our political system, and the Justices were under-
standably reluctant to go down that road in Davis. 
All of which tends to confirm that Justice Harlan was right 
when he argued in his Reynolds dissent that this was an ill-
considered decision, based on slogans rather than any analysis of 
the Constitution, and adopted without an appreciation of its 
radical implications. Maybe that means that Reynolds should be 
overruled. Or maybe it means that the Court should expressly 
limit Reynolds to its facts, and declare that its principles will not 
be applied elsewhere. But what it cannot mean is what Professor 
Tribe seems to conclude: that any method of counting votes is 
constitutional under Reynolds if it satisfies his personal, intuitive, 
and very peculiar, standards of "fairness": 
Put bluntly, Reynolds clearly supports some small degree of 
inaccuracy in the count so long as the method of counting is 
fair, and Davis contemplates a large dollop of politics in de-
veloping the method of counting. The procedure that the 
Florida Supreme Court developed to implement the enact-
ments of the Florida Legislature-a procedure that included 
representatives of the candidates and was overseen by an im-
partial magistrate-certainly passed this test.53 
51. The Reynolds Court did note that a state might legitimately wish to discourage 
such gerrymandering, 377 U.S. at 581, but it made no effort to compare the vote-diluting 
effects of gerrymandering with those of malapportionment. For a useful comparison of 
the two techniques, see Daniel Polsby and Robert Popper, The Third Criterion: An In-
quiry Into the Use of Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerry-
mandering, 9 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 301 (1991). 
52. E.g., Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 223 (cited in note 1). 
53. Id. at 224 (footnote omitted). 
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As we have seen, Professor Tribe's idea of "fairness" is unten-
able. But there is a second reason why a comparison of the ma-
chine count with the court-ordered recount does not undermine 
the equal protection analysis in Bush v. Gore. In a footnote to 
the passage just quoted, Professor Tribe appears to suggest that 
under Reynolds and Davis a counting process can be "fair" even 
if the designer of the process knows the probable outcome of the 
design.54 Why? Because "apportionment is invariably designed 
in full knowledge of its probable consequences."55 But while this 
is inevitably true of apportionment, it is not inevitably true of 
processes for counting votes. Which, I suppose, is why Professor 
Tribe concedes that counting all the ballots on which Gore's 
name was marked, but not the ballots on which Bush's name was 
marked, would violate Reynolds. 56 
Now suppose that the Florida court had decreed that the 
ballots would be counted by several different methods, all of 
which were within a tolerable range of imperfection, and that 
Gore would be declared the winner if he came out ahead in any 
one of these various recounts. Professor Tribe would probably 
concede that this was "unfair" and that it would violate Rey-
nolds. But suppose that one candidate was declared the winner 
after the ballots were counted in the usual manner (a manner 
that was, so far as any court could know at the time, within a tol-
erable range of imperfection), and the ballots were then ordered 
recounted in a novel and arbitrary way. This, of course, is Bush 
v. Gore. Given that one candidate had already come out ahead 
after the ballots were counted in the usual way, this could hurt 
only that particular candidate, and it could help only his oppo-
nent. Notwithstanding this undeniable fact, and notwithstanding 
that this fact was knowable with absolute certainty when the 
novel and arbitrary recount was invented, Professor Tribe de-
clares that this "certainly" passes a fairness test. Nothing could 
be less certain. 
Thus, although Professor Tribe spends many pages scruti-
nizing the processes that led to the certified results in the Florida 
election, diligently searching for every possible example of non-
uniformity in the way that ballots were counted by election offi-
54. Professor Tribe doesn't quite say this. Instead, he juxtaposes a statement about 
the designers of apportionment with a statement about the counters of votes. But he must 
be trying to defend the vote counting process designed by the Florida court, for other-
wise his footnote would be pointless. 
55. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 224 n.206 (cited in note 1). 
56. Id. at 224. 
562 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:543 
cials in Florida's sixty-seven counties/7 he ignores the most sali-
ent difference between the initial counting processes and the 
court-ordered recount. Nobody knew or could even guess how 
the various and uncoordinated decisions of officials in all these 
counties might affect the outcome of any election, while nobody 
could fail to see that the court-ordered recount could help only 
one particular candidate. 
Both equal protection doctrine and any disinterested con-
cept of fairness require that the adoption of such a patently bi-
ased arrangement be subjected to close scrutiny. The Bush v. 
Gore Court properly asked how this recount could be justified. 
Nobody has provided any reasoned justification for it. Not the 
four Florida judges who adopted it over the strong objections of 
their three dissenting colleagues. Not the two dissenters in Bush 
v. Gore who refused to agree with the other seven members of 
the Court. And not Professor Tribe. "EQUAL PROTECTION 
MY ASS!" may be an understandable expression of partisan 
emotion by disappointed political activists, but it is not a slogan 
that deserves to be given academic respectability. 
II. THE POLITICAL DOCTRINE QUESTION 
When Professor Tribe said that "Davis contemplates a large 
dollop of politics in developing the method of counting," he pre-
figured a separate and independent objection to the decision in 
Bush v. Gore. Whatever one thinks of the Court's equal protec-
tion analysis, the decision would be wrong if the case was nonjus-
ticiable under the so-called political question doctrine. And, in 
fact, Professor Tribe asserts without qualification that this was 
indeed a nonjusticiable case.58 In defending this assertion, Pro-
fessor Tribe employs arguments that are even more spectacu-
larly indefensible than those he used to attack the Court's equal 
protection analysis. 
Let's begin with what the Court did. As Professor Tribe cor-
rectly notes, the Court simply ignored the political question doc-
trine. Less correctly, he sardonically treats this as an amazingly 
irresponsible suppression of an obviously relevant consideration: 
How remarkable was it that neither the Court's per curiam 
opinion nor the Chief Justice's concurrence so much as men-
tioned the political question issue, much less attempted to jus-
57. I d. at 254-63. 
58. Id. at 280. 
2002] "EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"? 
tify its assertion of authority in the face of the seemingly ap-
plicable political question doctrine? It's hardly the sort of 
thing a Supreme Court Justice simply forgets about. And even 
if it were59the briefs called the attention of the Justices to the problem. 
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In a footnote appended to this passage, Professor Tribe cites two 
amicus briefs. One of them made a nonjusticiability argument, 
but it was filed in a different case that did not involve any equal 
protection issues.60 The other brief, which was at least filed in 
Bush v. Gore, made only a passing reference to the political-
question doctrine, without arguing that the case was nonjusticia-
ble. And what about the briefs that Professor Tribe himself filed 
in these two cases? None of those briefs contains any mention of 
nonjusticiability or of the political-question doctrine, and none 
of them contains any reference to the amicus briefs to which he 
now says the Court should have paid such close attention. 
One might ask the same kind of sardonic questions about 
Tribe the litigator that Tribe the commentator asks about the 
Supreme Court.61 But perhaps it will be more profitable to note 
that the dissenters in Bush v. Gore also failed to argue that the 
case was nonjusticiable, just like the Court's majority and just 
like Tribe the litigator. Professor Tribe doesn't disclose this fact 
about the Bush v. Gore dissenters, and indeed one might be led 
to think the opposite by his comment that "Justices Breyer and 
Souter held their colleagues' feet to the fire on the point."62 But 
it is true nonetheless: nobody on the Supreme Court contended 
that Bush v. Gore was nonjusticiable. 
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion contains a lengthy argu-
ment in which he energetically contends that the Court should 
have refused to decide the case on prudential grounds of judicial 
restraint, but Breyer never contends that the case was nonjusti-
ciable. And Professor Tribe's current position is emphatically 
not the same as Breyer's. According to Professor Tribe: 
59. Id. at 279 (footnote omitted). 
60. The case was Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000), 
which arose from litigation challenging the Florida Secretary of State's interpretation of 
the state laws that set deadlines for counties to complete hand recounts requested by 
Gore and his allies. It is worth emphasizing that the Supreme Court decided this case 
unanimously, and that not a single member of the Court endorsed the nonjusticiability 
argument proffered in the amicus brief, or even considered it worth mentioning. 
61. As Peter Berkowitz has pointed out, in Tribe vs. Truth, The Weekly Standard 
29, 33 (Feb. 4, 2002). 
62. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 279-80 (cited in note 1). 
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[T]he only lawful choice [for the Supreme Court], not because 
of any theory of passive virtues or because the counsel of pru-
dence so dictated, but rather because the Constitution so 
commanded the Court, was not to inject itself into the dis-
pute.63 
There are two very good reasons why neither Justice Breyer, nor 
any other member of the Court, nor any of the litigants, claimed 
that Bush v. Gore was nonjusticiable: Baker v. Carr and McPher-
son v. Blacker. Baker v. Carr,64 the leading case on the political-
question doctrine, decided that vote-dilution claims-that is, the 
very type of claim that Bush v. Gore upheld-are justiciable. 
That was not necessarily dispositive in Bush v. Gore because 
Baker did not involve a presidential election, but McPherson v. 
Blacker was indeed dispositive. That case raised several ques-
tions under Article II, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments, and the Electoral Count Act, and the Court held as fol-
lows: 
It is argued that the subject-matter of the controversy is not 
of judicial cognizance, because it is said that all questions 
connected with the election of a presidential elector are po-
litical in their nature; that the court has no power finally to 
dispose of them; and that its decision would be subject to re-
view by political officers and agencies, as the state board of 
canvassers, the legislature in joint convention, and the gover-
nor, or, finally, the congress. 
But the judicial power of the United States extends to all 
cases in law or equity arising under the constitution and laws 
of the United States, and this is a case so arising, since the va-
lidity of the state law was drawn in question as repugnant to 
such constitution and laws, and its validity was sustained. 
Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135. And it matters not that the 
judgment to be reviewed may be rendered in a proceeding for 
mandamus. Hartman v. Greenhaw, 102 U. S. 672. 
As we concur with the state court, its judgment has been af-
firmed; if we had not, its judgment would have been reversed. 
In either event, the questions submitted are finally and defi-
nitely disposed of by the judgment which we pronounce, and 
that judgment is carried into effect by the transmission of our 
mandate to the state court. 65 
63. ld. at 280 (emphasis in original). 
64. 369 u.s. 215 (1962). 
65. 146 u.s. 1, 23-24 (1892). 
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The holding in this case was well known to all the Justices and all 
the litigants in Bush v. Gore. Only a few days before that deci-
sion, the Supreme Court had unanimously relied on dicta in 
McPherson when it vacated an earlier decision of the Florida 
Supreme Court in a different case arising from the disputed elec-
tion.66 Nobody could have contended with a straight face that 
this holding did not cover Bush v. Gore. And nobody tried. 
Amazingly, however, Professor Tribe now contends that 
McPherson was not controlling. Here is his argument: McPher-
son dealt with a pre-election challenge to a state's mode of 
choosing electors whereas Bush v. Gore dealt with questions 
raised "in the heat of battle."67 But the opinion in McPherson 
contains not the slightest hint of any such distinction. 
Even more amazingly, Professor Tribe hints that the distinc-
tion he has invented finds support in a different set of prece-
dents. He does this by citing a passage in his own treatise,68 
which compares Gilligan v. Morgan69 with Scheuer v. Rhodes.70 
But the suggestion is baseless. Gilligan held that the political 
question doctrine precluded the issuance of an injunction "re-
quiring initial judicial review and continuing surveillance by a 
federal court over the training, weaponry and orders of the 
[Ohio National] Guard, [because such an injunction would] em-
brace critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in 
the Legislative and Executive Branches of the [federal] Gov-
ernment."71 In the context of Bush v. Gore, an analogous case 
would involve "continuing regulatory jurisdiction,"72 over Con-
gress' exercise of its responsibilities under the Twelfth Amend-
ment. Nothing remotely like this was at issue in Bush v. Gore. 
Contrary to Professor Tribe's characterization, moreover, 
Scheuer did not involve the same "question" that was presented 
in Gilligan.73 Scheuer did not even address any political-question 
objection, so it could not and did not suggest any distinction be-
tween challenges brought "in advance" and those brought "in 
the heat of battle." 
66. Bush v. Palm Beach Cry. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
67. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 283 (cited in note 1). 
68. See id. at 282-83 & n.455. 
69. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
70. 416 u.s. 232 (1974). 
71. 413 U.S. at 7 (footnote omitted). 
72. !d. at 5. 
73. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 283 n.455 (cited in note 1). 
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What could Professor Tribe possibly mean when he says 
that the Court's "only lawful choice" was to refuse to rule in 
Bush v. Gore? Nobody could seriously base such a sweeping and 
unequivocal claim on the completely novel distinction by which 
he tries to get around the holding in McPherson. The only possi-
bility, I think, is that Professor Tribe must believe that his dis-
tinction between challenges brought "in advance" and those 
brought "in the heat of battle" is one dictated by the Constitu-
tion (though never previously recognized by the Court). That 
seems to be the implication of his claim that "the Constitution [] 
commanded the Court" not to decide this case/4 or as he else-
where says, that "[t]he requisite textual commitment to a politi-
cal branch could hardly be clearer." 75 
Whatever merit there may be in the notion that the Consti-
tution should be construed to commit the issues raised in Bush v. 
Gore exclusively to Congress (an interpretive suggestion that 
would require a great deal more elaboration than Professor 
Tribe provides), the one thing we know for sure is that the text 
of the Constitution does not expressly do any such thing. The 
Twelfth Amendment assigns certain tasks to Congress, and Bush 
v. Gore did not review Congress' performance of those tasks in 
connection with the 2000 election. Nor did the Court claim any 
power to do so. There simply is no case law, and no constitu-
tional basis for any case law, that would conflate Supreme Court 
review of congressional actions under the Twelfth Amendment 
with Supreme Court review of a judicial decision by a subordi-
nate state court. 76 
Nowhere in his article does Professor Tribe point to any 
"textually demonstrable" commitment to Congress of the exclu-
sive power to review state court judgments for alleged violations 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with presidential 
elections. His assertion that the Constitution "commanded" the 
Court to make a single "lawful choice" might best be described 
as unsupported. Or, adopting the language that Professor Tribe 
74. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 280 (cited in note 1). 
75. Id. at 277-78 (footnotes citing the Twelfth Amendment and Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 215 (1962), omitted). 
76. For that reason, Professor Tribe's cause is not advanced by his citation of Nixon 
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 281-82 (cited in note 1). 
In that case, the Court refused to overturn an impeachment conviction rendered by the 
United States Senate, and the decision would have been relevant to a case in which the 
Court was asked to overturn a decision by Congress about the winner of a presidential 
election. But such a hypothetical case has nothing to do with Bush v. Gore, which merely 
reviewed the validity of a judgment by a subordinate state court. 
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uses to attack the Supreme Court, one might say that his asser-
tion does "not fare too well in the 'truth in advertising' depart-
ment."77 
III. WAS THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION A 
POINTLESSLY SELF-INFLICTED WOUND BECAUSE 
BUSH'S TRIUMPH WAS INEVITABLE? 
Amidst the dazzling and intricate argumentation in Profes-
sor Tribe's very lengthy commentary on Bush v. Gore, there is a 
tantalizing passage in which he argues that Bush would almost 
certainly have become President even if the Court had not de-
cided this case in his favor, and that this would have been appar-
ent to the Justices when they decided Bush v. Gore.78 Professor 
Tribe's argument is straightforward: even if Gore had come out 
ahead in the Florida court's recount, Florida's Republican legis-
lature or her Republican Secretary of State probably would have 
sent Congress the votes from a slate of Bush electors, and Con-
gress probably would have accepted those votes. 
This argument is tantalizing because it points in three 
somewhat different directions. First, it reinforces Professor 
Tribe's entirely appropriate refusal to join the many reckless 
commentators who have ascribed partisan motivations to the 
Bush v. Gore majority. Second, it tends to confirm Professor 
Tribe's claim that Bush v. Gore was part of a pattern of hubristic, 
antidemocratic decisions by a Court that has recently developed 
the bad habit of inserting itself into matters that ought to be left 
to the political process. And third, the argument subtly suggests 
that Professor Tribe himself has little reason to be influenced by 
partisan bias in his commentary: even if the Court had accepted 
the arguments in the briefs he filed, or the (substantially differ-
ent) arguments that he now advances, Gore probably would not 
have become President. Or to put it slightly differently, Profes-
sor Tribe probably isn't suffering from what I called "acquired 
conviction syndrome" because he doesn't think that the litiga-
tion in which he participated could have accomplished the cli-
ent's goal, even if he had prevailed. In the practically most im-
portant sense, this case was always a loser. 
Can it really be that all of the intense litigation over Flor-
ida's electoral votes was essentially a waste of time because Re-
77. Id. at 282. 
78. Id. at 276-77. See also id. at 287. 
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publican elected officials were going to put Bush in the White 
House no matter what the courts did with Gore's lawsuit? What-
ever Professor Tribe may believe, it appears that his co-counsel 
believes no such thing. At an academic conference about a year 
after the election, Ronald A. Klain was presented by a ques-
tioner with essentially the same argument that Professor Tribe 
makes here. Mr. Klain answered as follows: 
I think it was always our view that if there was a recount in 
Florida that was determined to be lawful, consistent with the 
Constitution and showed that Al Gore had gotten more votes, 
that we really couldn't conceive that someone would take of-
fice contrary to that. 
Whether it was through Governor Bush withdrawing or 
through a judicial proceeding that ordered a retrieval of the 
certificates of ascertainments and rival certificates being is-
sued, you know, I just didn't- I never believed that either 
candidate, notwithstanding the machinations in the Florida 
legislature and everything else that was going on there, was 
prepared to take office contrary to the outcome of a recount 
that was determined to be legally valid. I just don't think that 
would have happened. 79 
In my view, Mr. Klain's analysis is clearly right,80 and it is even 
more clear that it was offered in a spirit of candor. If a balanced 
evaluation of Bush v. Gore is ever to be written by one of the 
disap~ointed litigators in the case, Mr. Klain may be the one to 
do it. 1 
79. Bush v. Gore: A One Year Retrospective, Federalist Society National Lawyers 
Convention, Nov. 17, 2001 (response of Ronald Klain to Professor Todd Zywicki) (tran-
script available at p. 81 of <http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Engage/OnlineEngage. 
pdf>)). Mr. Klain was one of the signatories of Gore's brief in Bush v. Gore, and Profes-
sor Tribe has had this to say about his role in the election litigation: 
The credit for the strategy and tactics pursued before the county canvassing 
boards and in the state courts in the Florida vote-counting contest in fact be-
longs not solely to David Boies, brilliant strategist and tactician though he is, 
but also, and perhaps principally, to Ronald A. Klain, who had been Vice Presi-
dent Gore's extraordinary Chief of Staff in the White House and was his chief 
legal counselor during the election and in the recount litigation. 
Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 183 n.23 (cited in 1). 
80. The validity of his analysis does not depend on the assumption that the recount 
ordered by the Florida court would have been conducted in a fair or lawful manner. Cf. 
Elhauge, Florida 2000: Bush Wins Again! (cited in note 46). 
81. Mr. Klain has published an impressive defense of the Gore team's legal strategy 
that does not pretend to be a balanced or disinterested analysis of the Supreme Court's 
performance. Ronald A. Klain and Jeremy B. Bash, The Labor of Sisyphus: The Gore 
Recount Perspective 157-76, in Larry J. Sabato, ed., Overtime! The Election 2000 Thriller 
(Longman Publishers, 2002). 
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CONCLUSION 
Professor Tribe's commentary on Bush v. Gore exhibits a 
very high degree of skill in the arts of persuasion. But admirable 
skills can sometimes be used for improper ends. Here, Professor 
Tribe's goal is to advance two very grave charges against the Su-
preme Court. First, he contends that the holding in Bush v. Gore 
merits the contemptuously dismissive remark, "EQUAL 
PROTECfiON, MY ASS!" Second, he claims that at least five 
Justices "have little but disdain for Congress as a serious partner 
in the constitutional enterprise, and not much patience with 'We 
the People' as the ultimate source of sovereignty in this repub-
lic."82 Professor Tribe has simply failed to establish any founda-
tion at all for such serious accusations. 
He bases his indictment primarily on two propositions: that 
the Court's equal protection analysis is legally untenable, and 
that the case in any event raised only nonjusticiable political 
questions. As I believe I have shown, both propositions are un-
sustainable. What's more, Professor Tribe fails to come to grips 
with the facts that two of the dissenters in Bush v. Gore agreed 
that the Florida court had violated the Equal Protection Clause 
(as had three out of seven members of the Florida court itself) 
and that none of the dissenters argued that the case was nonjusti-
ciable. 
Professor Tribe's verdict is so far over the top that it might 
best be explained by reference to the "acquired conviction syn-
drome" described at the beginning of this paper. But whatever 
may explain it, the true House of Mirrors can be found in Pro-
fessor Tribe's article, not in the Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore. 
82. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 290 (cited in 1). 
